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This paper analyzes the effects of land use constraints on housing prices. We provide a new 
framework for evaluating policy when mobility across regions is allowed but limited. A key 
result is that loosening regulatory constraints within individual regions would have little effect 
on prices for plausible parameterizations. For example, we show reasonable conditions under 
which, even if every building in Manhattan were 100 stories tall, prices would fall by less 
than 15 percent. 
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Quigley, Jacob Sagi, and Johan Walden for helpful suggestions. Regulatory supply constraints are sometimes blamed for high housing prices in the coastal
United States.1 This paper analyzes the eﬀects of land use constraints in a world in which
people are mobile, but preferences over diﬀerent locations are heterogeneous. A key result
of this paper is that loosening density restrictions within individual regions would have little
eﬀect on prices for plausible parameterizations. For example, we show reasonable conditions
under which, even if every building in Manhattan were 100 stories tall, prices would fall
by less than 15 percent. This calculation does not take into account the potential amenity
losses and general equilibrium wage changes associated with such extreme population growth.
Under the same conditions, in metropolitan New York, halving land prices would require
multiplying developpable land supply in existing locations by approximately 15 times.
It is diﬃcult to assess the role of land use constraints empirically because we do not
observe the same city at the same time with and without these regulations.2 A believable
theoretical model of regulations’ eﬀects on prices can thus help inform policy debates.
Classical urban economic theory provides two contradictory models to assess impacts,
and both rely on unrealistic assumptions. If cities have immobile populations, then land use
constraints lower the welfare of the regulated city and may have large price eﬀects if demand
for space is inelastic. If there is unfettered mobility across regions, then land use constraints
in any individual city have equal welfare eﬀects across all cities and can only raise prices in
the regulated city relative to other cities through increased amenity.
This paper considers the eﬀects of land use constraints in a more realistic world in which
mobility is free, but consumers balance housing cost against wage diﬀerentials or taste for
living in one city or another. This mobility scenario is similar to that described by Gyourko
et al. [5]. The eﬀects of supply constraints on prices depend on the extent of heterogeneity in
willingness to pay for space in the regulated city. With very diverse valuations, we approach
1See, e.g. Glaeser et al. [4, 3, 2].
2Glaeser et al. [2] argue that apartment prices in Manhattan would fall to currently observed (regulated)
marginal cost if height restrictions were lifted. This assumes marginal cost is independent of building height.
If marginal cost is increasing in building height the resulting equilibrium price would be greater.
2the closed city model with ﬁxed population. When tastes are almost homogeneous, we
approach the open city model. This approach allows us to extend the work of Arnott and
MacKinnon [1], who ﬁnd small welfare eﬀects of supply constraints in a single closed city. 3
We assume that the consumer price of a square foot of structure is exogenously given, but
land is in limited supply and has an endogenous price. We ask what eﬀect a small increase
in the supply of land has on the price of land, ignoring amenity or wage consequences. A
direct application of this analysis would be to ask what eﬀect removal of land for critical
habitat protection has on land prices (assuming the habitat has no amenity value).
Our model applies equally well to a city where all land is covered by a constrained
number of stories of apartments. In that case, land prices become irrelevant to consumers of
apartments, conditional on the price per square foot of apartment space, and what we call
a unit of “land” can be interpreted as a square foot of apartment space.
The model does not precisely describe height restrictions or minimum lot size require-
ments in a world in which some people would prefer to live in apartments and others prefer
to live in detached homes. We suspect that our results are instructive in those widely ap-
plicable cases, but leave more nuanced analysis to future work. We ignore the amenity and
wage eﬀects of additional supply and abstract away from within-market heterogeneity of land
quality. These abstractions can be justiﬁed by noting that the primary argument against
supply constraints is that they reduce the supply of housing, thereby raising prices, not that
they cause wages or amenities to be diﬀerent from what they would otherwise be, nor that
they distort substitution between land and structures on the land that is available. The sign
of wage and amenity eﬀects of supply constraints are ambiguous and depend on the nature
of externalities, congestion costs, and the shape of production functions.
3Arnott and MacKinnon [1] conclude by stating: “It would also be of interest to consider the eﬀect of
the openness of the city on the cost of height restrictions. Cases intermediate between the completely open
and completely closed city can be dealt with by introducing an elasticity of population with respect to
utility.” A reduced form elasticity is used in a diﬀerent context by Wheaton [8]. Our approach provides a
microfoundation for population elasticities with respect to prices or incomes.
3We consider a static world, meant to represent a long-run equilibrium. We assume for
simplicity that proﬁts from land development are distributed to an absentee landlord. We
justify this simpliﬁcation on the grounds that the eﬀect of residents’ wealth at the time of
zoning on a long-run equilibrium is plausibly small, as do Arnott and MacKinnon [1].
In our model, a continuum of N consumers in a nation may live in any of a number
of locations. In one of these locations, an island, there are only L units of land. Because
the entire island is assumed to be occupied in equilibrium, there is an endogenous price per
unit, which we denote q. The island is meant to approximate a region where the quantity of
desirable land is limited by transportation costs and perhaps regulation.
Consumer preferences give rise to the price per acre of land θi at which they are indiﬀerent
between living on the island and living at their next preferred location. We denote land price
and wealth for individual i at the next preferred location o by qoi and yoi. We assume that the
island is suﬃciently small relative to other locations (or that other locations have suﬃciently
elastic land supply) that migration between the island and other locations has negligible
eﬀects on the outside prices.
For our purpose, to ﬁnd the price eﬀect of supply constraints on the island, we only
need to know how the willingness to pay per acre of land θi is distributed in the national
population. To determine welfare eﬀects, one would need to know where θi comes from. One
source of this distribution would be a distribution of indirect utility functions. For example,
θi could be deﬁned for an individual i with wealth yi on the island by
v(θi,1,yi,live on island) = v(qoi,1,yoi,live in next preferred location). (1)
Speciﬁcation (1) assumes that taste for living on the island is not associated with demand
for land relative to all other goods for island residents. All other goods, including structures
in the majority of markets where land consumption matters, are subsumed into a numeraire
(hence the “1” in the indirect utility function). Land demand for individual i is assumed
not to depend on θi only for notational convenience.
For all wealth levels, the minimum value of θ that lives on the island when land costs
4q per acre is q, since indirect utility is decreasing in consumer prices. We thus have the






l(q,1,y)f(y,θ)dθdy − L = 0. (2)
l(q,1,y) represents marshallian demand for island land. We drop the price arguments from
here forward. The bivariate probability density function f(y,θ) is the density of consumers
with wealth y if on the island and indiﬀerent between the island and their next preferred
location if the island’s price is θ.
We are interested in the change in prices induced by a change in land supply. Diﬀerenti-


















Rearranging equation (3) and deﬁning ηlq(y) as the elasticity of land demand with respect






















Multiplying both sides of equation (4) by L
q, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of land price with



























The inverse of the elasticity is composed of two terms. The ﬁrst term is a product of
two parts. The ﬁrst part is the ratio of average land demand of marginal entrants to the
average land demand of people living on the island. We assume in the following analysis that
this ratio is equal to one.4 The second part of the ﬁrst term is the marginal hazard ratio of
4New entrants’ lower willingness to pay might signal lower incomes and hence lower land demand, but
could also signal greater land demand holding income constant. This mirrors the ambiguity over whether
high or low income residents will live closer to the center of a monocentric city.
5living in the island evaluated at q multiplied by q.5 The second term ¯ ηlq is the elasticity of
demand for land of people already living on the island that is weighted by their respective
land consumption. We note that ηqL is negative unless land is a Giﬀen good.
We can bound the magnitude of ηqL by noting that Gyourko and Voith [6] summarize
empirical estimates for the population average elasticity of land demand with respect to
price, ¯ ηlq, ranging from -.5 to -1.0. Taking the highest value of -.5, we ﬁnd that the maximum
absolute value of elasticity of land price with respect to quantity is 2. It is unrealistic to think
that no one would move in or out of coastal cities if prices change, however, so elasticities
must be larger than -2.
Table 1 summarizes the elasticity of land price with respect to quantity that arises under
diﬀerent distributions of θ in the population. We consider four distributions: the uniform,
the Pareto, the normal and the lognormal. We oﬀer no opinion on which distribution is
the most reasonable, except to note that substitution among land, choice of city, and other
goods implies that this distribution need not look like the income distribution. We recognize
that identifying distributional parameters empirically would be quite challenging. Under
the normal and in some cases uniform distributions, there are some negative valuations; our
results are unchanged if negative values are replaced with valuations of zero (or any valuation
less than q.)6
For each of these four distributions, we can calculate the elasticity of interest, ηqL by
specifying: (1) the fraction of national population that lives in a region and (2) the median
valuation θ in the population as a fraction of the price q, and by (3) normalizing prices
relative to q = 1. These three speciﬁcations are suﬃcient to identify f(q) and F(q) for any
5In the expression for the marginal hazard ratio f(q)/(1 − F(q)), the density f(q) and cumulative dis-
tribution function F(q) corresponds to the marginal distribution of θ that has been derived from the joint
distribution of θ and y integrated over all values of y.
6Analyzing willingness to live in a metropolitan area as a function of price per unit of land (or ﬂoor space)
is only meaningful when the population for housing market equilibrium is limited to those who would be
willing to move to a metropolitan area if housing were free. Negative threshold price per unit of land for
moving into metropolitan area is not consistent with standard consumer choice assumptions.
6distribution deﬁned by just two parameters. This is because we know q at two points in
the distribution: the 50th percentile and the percentile determined by the region’s share of
national population. The only controversial speciﬁcation is choice of the median willingness
to pay per acre in the population, and we vary that parameter widely in the simulations. The
demand elasticity ¯ ηlq and the probability density f(q) should be interpreted as a land-share
weighted averages across all incomes, following the discussion above.
We consider valuations of 10, 30, and 60 percent of current price as population medians.
That is, we assume that the median American would move to the market in question if prices
were 90, 70, or 40 percent lower than the current price. In evaluating the realism of these
medians, note willingness to pay should be considerably larger in the long run we consider
than in the short run. The lower the population median, the greater the magnitude of ηqL.
This is because as the median falls relative to current price, the density of the population
that is indiﬀerent between living in the city or not living in the city falls, since this value
is moving into the right tail of the distribution and because the variance of the distribution
rises, leaving all densities f(x) smaller. When population in the city is large enough, low
population median implies inﬁnite expectation for the corresponding Pareto distribution.7
In Table 1, we consider the eﬀect of price changes in islands with varying shares of
national population and mention real world areas with similar populations. For the cases of
Manhattan and Hanover, New Hampshire, we recognize that the assumption that the prices
of nearby areas do not adjust down if there were a population shift into the central district
is wrong, so that there is some negative feedback to willingness to pay in the market in
question, which would imply our results understate the price eﬀect. In those cases, though,
the density of the population at q would likely spike due to the equilibrium condition of
indiﬀerence among locations within a metropolitan area for similar households, and this
likely stronger eﬀect implies our results overstate the price eﬀect.
We ﬁnd generally small elasticities. For apartments in Manhattan, a demand elasticity
for apartment space of -.4 would be moderate based on Hanushek and Quigley [7]. Under
7The corresponding normal, uniform and lognormal distributions have ﬁnite expectations.
7the normal distribution, this implies that the elasticity of interest ηqL is not far from −0.1,
whatever the median threshold price θ. With a constant elasticity, this implies that multi-
plying quantity by eight would reduce price by less than 15 percent. Multiplying quantity
by eight in Manhattan would imply uniform heights of 100 stories,8 which the architects
and planners we have talked with say would be devastating for amenity and generate high
marginal construction cost. Substantially reducing price by increasing supply without major
amenity eﬀects thus appears infeasible in Manhattan.
The New York metropolitan area, with between ﬁve and ten percent of national popula-
tion, is more plausibly a single housing market than Manhattan. For the metropolitan area,
land (as opposed to square footage) is plausibly the scarce commodity. Gyourko and Voith
[6] suggest that -.7 is a moderate demand elasticity for land. Table 1 implies that under the
normal distribution, if the median American would be induced to move to metropolitan New
York by a 70 percent reduction in price, halving land prices would require a 15-fold increase
in available land. This follows from the listed elasticity of -.26: (15−.26 ≈ .5).
An alternative way to answer the question posed here would be to ask: what would a
given elasticity of price with respect to land supply imply about the distribution of will-
ingness to pay conditional on the land or square footage elasticity? We performed these
calculations focusing on the central case of a land price elasticity of 1. The implications
on the distributions were unreasonable: e.g. in order for the land price elasticity to be 1
for the metro New York region (10% of the national population), 87% of Americans would
not be willing to move there unless price was zero (assuming normal distribution) and the
median willingness to pay for land would have to be 0.468% of the current price under Pareto
distribution. For Manhattan (.7% of the population), the corresponding values were 99%
mass at zero willingness to pay under normal distribution and median willingness to pay less
than 0.0001% of the current price under Pareto distribution.9
It has become fashionable to discuss “two Americas”: one consisting of of large coastal
8The 2005 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey data show a mean height of at least 12.5 stories.
9These calculation are available upon request from the authors.
8metropolitan areas, where land use constraints are common, and the other consisting of
largely unregulated exurban or rural interior regions. Land supply is generally thought to
be quite elastic in the second region. If we bundle the 10 largest metropolitan areas (mostly
coastal) into a single “island” region and the remainder of the country into another, then
the assumption that outside prices do not change when island land supply changes may not
be too far oﬀ. In Table 1, we ﬁnd that with approximately 30% of US population, the price
elasticity with respect to land supply in the meta coastal region would be approximately .5 if
the median American would move into the coastal region if land prices fell by forty percent.
In this case, prices would fall by approximately thirty percent if land supply doubled in
the largest coastal cities. By contrast, if the median American would be induced to move
into the largest regions with a 10 percent reduction in price, then the elasticity falls to .15,
and a doubling of supply would lead to a price decrease of just ten percent. Further, the
assumption of a single market is suspect given easily available data. According to the 2000
US Census, residents of the Northeast were likelier to move to the South than to the West.
Residents of the West were more likely to move to the South or Midwest than the Northeast.
Recognizing that US prices may aﬀect US population, we have presumably overstated the
elasticity of price with respect to land supply.
We conclude that individual metropolitan areas are unlikely to increase “aﬀordability”
by encouraging more supply. Smaller metropolitan areas are likely to meet even less success
than larger ones. If all regulated regions simultaneously lifted supply constraints, the price
consequences might be somewhat larger. The price consequences of supply regulations de-
pend on the distribution of threshold prices that induce mobility into diﬀerent regions across
the entire national population, and we recommend that empirical research focus on ways of
identifying parameters of these distributions.
9Table 1: Elasticity of land price with respect to land quantity ηqL under diﬀerent
distributions of willingness to pay θ and diﬀerent land demand elasticities ¯ ηlq
Top panel: land demand elasticity ¯ ηlq = .4
Elasticity ηqL under distribution...
Market size
National Population Analog Median valuation θ
price q Pareto Lognormal Normal Uniform
0.0020% Hanover, NH .1 -0.2084 -0.1231 -0.0496 0.0000
0.0020% Hanover, NH .3 -0.1135 -0.0659 -0.0388 -0.0000
0.0020% Hanover, NH .6 -0.0494 -0.0284 -0.0223 -0.0000
0.7% Manhattan .1 -0.4437 -0.2969 -0.1251 -0.0127
0.7% Manhattan .3 -0.2535 -0.1646 -0.0984 -0.0099
0.7% Manhattan .6 -0.1142 -0.0726 -0.0572 -0.0057
10.0% Metro New York .1 -0.8613∗ -0.7264 -0.3450 -0.2064
10.0% Metro New York .3 -0.5758 -0.4409 -0.2768 -0.1636
10.0% Metro New York .6 -0.2816 -0.2082 -0.1661 -0.0962
30.0% Top 10 Metro .1 -1.6081∗ -1.5065 -0.9303 -0.8766
30.0% Top 10 Metro .3 -1.2132∗ -1.1056 -0.7888 -0.7394
30.0% Top 10 Metro .6 -0.7143∗ -0.6293 -0.5212 -0.4839
Bottom panel: land demand elasticity ¯ ηlq = .7
Market size
National Population Analog Median valuation θ
price q Pareto Lognormal Normal Uniform
0.0020% Hanover, NH .1 -0.1962 -0.1188 -0.0489 0.0000
0.0020% Hanover, NH .3 -0.1098 -0.0647 -0.0383 0.0000
0.0020% Hanover, NH .6 -0.0487 -0.0282 -0.0222 0.0000
0.7% Manhattan .1 -0.3916 -0.2726 -0.1206 -0.0127
0.7% Manhattan .3 -0.2355 -0.1568 -0.0956 -0.0099
0.7% Manhattan .6 -0.1104 -0.0710 -0.0562 -0.0057
10.0% Metro New York .1 -0.7148∗ -0.5964 -0.3126 -0.1944
10.0% Metro New York .3 -0.4910 -0.3894 -0.2556 -0.1559
10.0% Metro New York .6 -0.2597 -0.1960 -0.1582 -0.0935
30.0% Top 10 Metro .1 -1.0848∗ -1.0376 -0.7273 -0.6941
30.0% Top 10 Metro .3 -0.8895∗ -0.8302 -0.6379 -0.6052
30.0% Top 10 Metro .6 -0.5882∗ -0.5293 -0.4507 -0.4225
Note: ∗ denotes that the results relate to a Pareto distribution with an inﬁnite mean.
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